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Nabokov‘s protagonist‘s sufferings, suicide, and final happiness in The Eye (1930) can be analyzed through Foucault‘s 
policy of the ―care of the self‖ based on which an individual acts in a parrhesiastic relationship with himself to panoptically 
watch and discover himself. Smurov‘s first-person I/eye sacrifices his former self to be reborn from the surveying eyes of his 
separated self. This Panopticon metaphor is bifurcated into the monopticon and the synopticon, the former letting Smurov 
externally watch over himself and the latter reflecting back to him others‘ views of him. Thus, Smurov recognizes the true 
nature of his identity to be the sum of his concept of himself and his reflections in others‘ minds. He recognizes that he is 
always being panoptically watched and created. His final happiness, therefore, emphasizes that identity stands in a symbiotic 
relationship with the surveillance of the self, without which the individual stays in darkness.  
 




Subjectivity, as Michel Foucault (1997) defines it, is 
what we make of ourselves when we are carrying out 
a project of self-care. Subjectivity is not what we are, 
but it is an activity that we perform, an active 
becoming. In a project of self-discovery, self-care, or 
self-expression, our interest is in the self. Thus, the 
―care of the self‖ is the meaning of the efforts we 
make to change ourselves to better persons or to 
specific individuals in order to answer the question 
―What should one do with oneself?‖ (p. 87) Such a 
project guarantees a freedom from the human primary 
self, but freedom from the primary self does not mean 
abandoning ourselves in order to become thoroughly 
new individuals. We in fact try to know the different 
aspects of our nature towards a comprehensive 
recognition of ourselves. 
 
Taking care of one‘s self is partly suggested by the 
concept of the ―Panopticon‖ in Foucault‘s philosophy, 
which conveys the surveillance and the control of the 
individuals by a few guardians through constant and 
evaluative observations for better individual and 
collaborative performances. Foucault elaborates on 
Jeremy Bentham‘s concept of the Panopticon in 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(1979). As Bentham‘s typical prison structure, the 
Panopticon is a system of surveillance in which a few 
individuals within a central tower constantly watch 
over a multitude of people, controlling and 
conducting their activities. As a watching system, the 
Panopticon establishes in its subjects the awareness 
that they are being constantly observed, and that they 
must watch themselves to behave according to certain 
norms. Likewise, an individual can make himself 
stand in a position so that he can watch himself and 
watch over his own behavior from the outside. 
Stepping outside one‘s own self to overlook the state 
of one‘s life resembles the observing capabilities that 
the Panopticon allows an observer, including the 
monoptic and the synoptic views on one‘s self. While 
the monoptic view derives from the individual 
looking at himself, the synoptic view radiates from 
others looking at him. The common element is to step 
outside oneself, which in Foucauldian terms, is a 
process of conversion for accessing the truth about 
one‘s self. It includes a break within the self, a kind of 
self-sacrifice, a sacrifice of one‘s old self in the name 
of truth for the sake of a more comprehensive view of 
the self. Truth is thus never bestowed upon the 
subject, for no truth exists without a ―conversion‖ or a 
―transformation‖ of the subject. And truth, once 
accessed, ―enlightens the subject‖ and leaves him in 
tranquility (Taylor, 2011, pp. 143-146). 
 
This process of self-sacrifice is then completed 
through parrhesia, a practice that individuals should 
 Taghizadeh, A. & Haj‘jari, M.J. 
 
34 
perform to attain their freedom. Foucault (2001) 
defines parrhesia as a free and courageous speech 
about the truth of something, and the parrhesiastes or 
the ―parrhesiast‖ as the truth-teller, someone who 
knows and tells the truth. Knowing one‘s self is part 
of the truth. As such, the most important characteristic 
of the parrhesiast is his ―honest counsel‖ to people or 
to himself against ―self-delusion‖ and for a better 
recognition of the self (pp. 141-142). Accordingly, 
through the panoptic position, the individual tries to 
watch over himself in order to examine his behavior. 
In fact, an all-embracing outlook on one‘s own 
behavior reveals the truth about oneself and one‘s 
being. And this fact is inherent in the practice of 
parrhesia. Thus, the final purpose of parrhesia is self-
identification.   
 
As a ―semi-fantastic psychological novella‖ (Foster, 
1993, p. 73), The Eye (1930) – Sogliadatai in Russian 
and meaning a ―spy‖ or a ―watcher‖ (The Eye,1990) – 
highlights some of Nabokov‘s main thematic and 
structural concerns. As to the Foucauldian focus of 
the present study, the nature of identity and the most 
convenient state of happiness in the course of one‘s 
life–represented in the narrator‘s quest for ―the real 
Smurov‖ (The Eye,1990) –seem to be two of 
Nabokov‘s important concerns in the book.  
 
Smurov‘s identity crisis has been the subject of many 
interpretations, both thematically and structurally. 
Investigations into Smurov‘s state of being all share 
the fact that he is after his true identity, which he 
cannot finally achieve because of its dynamicity. 
Hence, his final adjustment to environmental changes 
constitutes a dynamic identity. These studies mostly 
elaborate upon Nabokov‘s own statement in the 
forward to the novella that the theme of the book is 
―the pursuit of an investigation which leads the 
protagonist through a hell of mirrors and ends in the 
merging of twin images‖ (Johnson, 1977, p. 1). Dean 
Flower (1987) analyzes the story and its references to 
the ―eye/I‖ in highlighting Nabokov‘s own life and 
identity crisis, as he was a writer in self-exile. 
Accordingly, The Eye can be read ―as a covert 
autobiography of the most self-condemning sort,‖ and 
the entire story may be interpreted ―as a howl of 
despair that he, Nabokov, does not really exist‖ (p. 
167). Thus, Smurov embodies some chief aspects of 
Nabokov‘s own identity (p. 169). Boyd (1990) 
believes that Smurov‘s final failure highlights a 
certain point in human condition while he relates it to 
Nabokov‘s artistic life. Connolly (1991) investigates 
into the book‘s similarities with Dostoyevsky‘s The 
Double, and later takes Nabokov‘s narrator as overtly 
split into two agents, ―narrator vs. observer‖ or ―that 
aspect of the self which displays authorial potential 
and that aspect of the self which functions as a 
character‖ (p. 32). Johnson (1997) discusses ―an 
emotionally detached, coldly observing ―Eye/I‖‖ as 
the narrator and ―a new, more dashing‖ personality as 
Smurov who is ―unaware of his dual identity‖, as 
someone who is both an observer and an observed (p. 
2). Smurov establishes his existence through the 
―mirror reflections‖ radiated from other characters‘ 
―surface‖ (p. 169). In The Mind’s Eye (2001), Karen 
Jacob discusses a number of elements in the novella, 
including narrativity, narcissism, and self-knowledge 
through the viewpoints of Descartes, Lacan, and 
Žižek. Regarding self-knowledge, she takes into 
consideration the hidden mechanisms of power that 
the ―detached posture‖ of the realist narrator and his 
―panoptic eye‖ equip him with (p. 64). Jacob‘ 
emphasis is on the authorial narrator‘s ―panoptic 
power‖ suggests that the narrator is ―obsessively‖ 
attempting to have his doppelganger participate in the 
―fantasy of surveillance‖ to make sense of ―the realist 
narrator‘s position‖ (pp. 52-53). She believes that the 
narrator‘s final failure spoils the parallelism between 
his own panoptic powers and those of the ―institutions 
of discipline, regularization, and supervision‖ that 
narrative authority is thought to represent in realism 
(p. 74). Altogether she tries to know ―how the 
subjectivized forms of viewing represented in The 
Eye inflect its treatment of surveillance as a narrative 
and possibly a social tool‖ (p. 71). 
 
The concern of the present study is similar to what is 
under taken by Straumann, Jacobs, and Grishokova. 
However, it is basically different from them; the 
present study has tried to investigate into Smurov‘s 
condition through an interdisciplinary approach 
regarding Foucault‘s concept of the Panopticon and 
its relation to self-recognition. The researchers hope 
that their fascination with some of Foucault‘s terms– 
the ―care of the self‖, parrhesia, and the Panopticon – 
will help them delve deeply enough into Smurov‘s 
condition to show how he comes to a state of self-
recognition through a policy of self-denial.  
 
Smurov‘s attempt at self-recognition incorporates a 
net of power relations, with himself and with others, 
which is always at work to constitute the condition of 
his own life as well as the life of any other man or 
woman. For the illumination of Smurov‘s conditions 
under Nabokov‘s panoptical eye, this article proposes 
a set of questions which it will attempt to answer: 
What is Smurov‘s real state of being? How is he 
experiencing life? At the end of the story, what is the 
nature of the pleasures which he thinks he is 
experiencing?  





Disgraced by Matilda‘s husband over adultery, 
Smurov feels utmost shame in front of the boys he 
tutors. This shame intensifies his former lighthearted 
thinking about suicide and the absurdity of the world. 
Thus, he shoots himself in the chest or over his heart, 
which leaves him lingering in a purgatorial imagina-
tion afterwards, if not in death and blankness. He then 
imagines that he has gained freedom of earthly 
suffering while he finds himself enclosed in bondages 
in a ward. He thus wonders saying, ―What a mighty 
thing was human thought, that it could hurtle on 
beyond death!‖ He thinks that his thought is still 
running after his physical death. He still feels the 
―crater of a hollow tooth‖ and has no idea of any 
burial of his dead body. He succumbs to the present 
illusion by taking part in it actively. He further creates 
a doctor over his own ―case of a light wound caused 
by an inaccurate bullet passing clean through the 
serratus.‖His ―little old lady‖ also appears and 
informs him that a pitcher has also been smashed by 
the shooting. He thinks, ―Oh, how cunningly, in what 
simple, everyday terms my thought explained the 
ringing and the gurgling that had accompanied me 
into nonexistence,‖ which might indicate his subcons-
cious level of recovery after the agony of shooting 
and anesthesia. In his imagination, he finds himself 
back to streets after his recovery. He thinks about his 
routines: fixing his smashed watch, getting cigarettes, 
money, etc. He then enters Weinstock‘s bookshop 
and befriends new people who reflect back different 
parts of his total identity to him. As Straumann (2008) 
says, not only does Smurov‘s ―disembodied 
imagination survive,‖ but in fact he divides himself 
into ―a narrated figure and the eye/I that controls both 
narration and perception.‖ And he goes on with 
watching the numerous masks of a personality, which 
finally turn out to be versions of himself and a world 
which is mostly the construction of his own 
imagination (p. 77). 
 
Smurov‘s ―solipsistic quest‖ (Wyllie, 2010, p. 
76), which begins after his suicidal attempt and 
transformation into an ―onlooker‖ (The Eye,1990), is 
an act of resistance or defense mechanism against his 
former self which he tries to overcome. In this act of 
overcoming, Smurov under goes a ―spiritual 
experience‖, which is a specific surrealist experiment 
within which people let their bodies speak, as 
Foucault explains in his debate on the ―new novel‖ 
and surrealist fiction (Vintges, 2011, p. 100). Charac-
ters in such novels go through experiences like 
―dreams, madness, folly, repetition, the double, the 
disruption of time, the return‖ which generate a 
coherent―constellation‖of actions (Foucault,1999, p. 
72). Such realms are the creations of ―a radical 
critique of rationality‖ (Carrette, 2000, p. 56). 
Therefore, Foucault finds it intriguing to ―think 
beyond the body/soul dualism of Western, 
Christian and Cartesian traditions‖ (Vintges, 2011, p. 
100). He tries to make sense of a ―spiritual 
corporality‖ and a ―reordering of spiritual concepts 
into the body‖ (Carrette, 2000, p. 54). As such, the 
first-person narrative of the suicidal attempt by ―a 
humiliated loser‖ generates ―a psychologically 
plausible character of a narrator-as-ghost‖ who finally 
finds himself alive, while he is aware of the fact that 
he has experienced corporeal death (Dolinin, 2005, 
p.61). In such realms, the individual feels free to act 
unboundedly and thus develops a new life and 
outlook towards life. The narrator is then wondering 
how to answer his ontological questions regarding the 
―potential split between the subject and the world‖: 
―what is my relation to the world? How do I know 
that I exist? What if I am a ghost, a shade, a spook? 
What is the status of my imagination?‖ (Strauman, 
2008, p. 77). Accordingly, stepping out of one‘s own 
self to overlook the state of one‘s life resembles the 
observing capabilities that the Panoptic on allows an 
observer. The remaining part of this article will 
attempt to elaborate on this issue.  
 
The Panoptic on Metaphor 
 
According to Foucault (1979), the Panoptic on is a 
great machine both for subjection and self-subjection. 
It induces in its subjects the awareness of their own 
constant visibility and thus enforces them to discipline 
their behavior according to its power mechanism. As 
such, the individuals are disciplined into a social range 
of behaviors which render them either normalized 
citizens or divergent ones. Smurov‘s identity crisis 
follows such problems of surveillance. The title of the 
novella and Smurov‘s wonderings highlight the fact 
that his problem is with the observing eye of himself 
and of others, which makes him behave in certain 
manners. 
 
On the story level, the panoptical perspective reveals 
itself on two grounds: the monoptic and the synoptic; 
the former dealing with the narrator‘s interactions 
with Smurov, who is in fact himself, and the latter 
dealing with the narrator-Smurov‘s counteractions 




―Monoptic‖ means ―with one eye‖ (Reber, 1985, p. 
468). From this term, there comes ―monopticons‖ 
which are kinds of security cameras in the form of 
android eyes. These were used by Monarch, a 
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character in Doctor Who series, to control his 
subjects, specifically in the episodes entitled Four to 
Doomsday (1982). The monopticons consistently 
watched over individuals and scanned the munder 
Monarch‘s orders. One can suggest that they were the 
more advanced forms of Big Brother‘s telescreens in 
Orwell‘s 1984 which were constantly watching the 
citizens for surveillance. In Dr. Who, the monopticons 
acted as ―disembodied‖ heads and ―intrusive‖ 
presences that were used to ―spy on the action‖ of 
other characters. As such, the word monopticon is a 
play on the concept of the Panopticon (O‘Day‘s, 
2011).The monopticon thus refers to the control of an 
individual by another individual or by him/herself. 
 
Having this concept in mind, one is tempted to 
consider Smurov‘s watchful eye over himself as such, 
a fact that is reflected in Nabokov‘s techniques of 
mirroring and doubling. Initially, the individual who 
watches over Smurov is himself, and we are 
concerned with his own surveying eye: 
Yet I was always exposed, always wide-eyed; 
even in sleep I did not cease to watch over 
myself, understanding nothing of my existence, 
growing crazy at the thought of not being able to 
stop being aware of myself. (The Eye, 1990, 
Kindle) 
 
We always find Smurov under his own observation, 
and he constantly and self-consciously watches over 
himself. It is as if his super ego is working on the 
conscious level and is always in charge of him. As 
such, he is simultaneously split into the subject and 
the object, one acting while the other recording those 
actions. This process is continued in the story until the 
subject and the object finally merge into one. Thus, 
we are subjected to two viewpoints of Smurov at the 
same time: a viewpoint of the observing narrator and 
a viewpoint of the Smurov who is being-observed. 
The narrator-Smurov has been there for stepping out 
his body and is able to ―make judgments about his 
own actions‖ (Mohanu, 2001, p. 80). In such a 
―fantasy of disembodiment‖ (Toker, 1999, p. 97), 
Smurov begins to describe himself in the third person, 
since he has escaped the prison of his body. He is now 
concerned with ―a centrifugally scattered self‖ 
(Jacobs, 2001, p. 76).The split of character that he is 
experiencing is an attempt at self-recognition, since 
stepping out of the subjective self is necessary to 
establish a disinterested image of it. Accordingly, 
Smurov watches over himself monoptically, as in a 
mirror-like encountering between himself and his 
image. Although a mirror reflects one‘s image 
without any presuppositions, Smurov discovers a 
nasty reflection of himself in it due to his concern 
with identity crisis:― A wretched, shivering, vulgar 
little man in a bowler hat stood in the center of the 
room, for some reason rubbing his hands. That is the 
glimpse I caught of myself in the mirror‖ (The Eye, 
1990, Kindle). Changing that view toward the self 
requires self-disciplinary attitudes. Therefore, beginn-
ing ―a new life‖ under the new role of being ―an 
onlooker‖ intensifies the panoticon metaphor of the 
book. And it is necessary to hold that, as such, the 
panoticon and the monopticon become the same, for 





The self-observing Smurov also attempts to shape 
himself into a new form and away from his pathetic 
past, and as Connolly (1999) observes, to defend 
himself ―against public opinion‖ as well (p. 145). This 
fact leads us to another play on the word Panopticon, 
that is, the synopticon which conveys the control of 
the minority by the majority or even the control of the 
individual by the many. It was first introduced by 
Thomas Mathieson (1997), who elaborated upon 
Foucault‘s argument about Bentham‘s Panopticon. 
Mathieson holds that through ―the control of the soul, 
vis-à-vis the control of the body‖ a sort of human 
being is generated who behaves himself ―through 
self-control‖ (p. 217). The former panoptic view 
regarding the surveillance of the majority by the few 
is now turned over on its head and changed into the 
surveillance of the minority by the majority as well as 
the individual by the people. And while the 
―normalizing gaze of panopticism‖ produces the 
subjectivity and the self-control which discipline 
people to fit into the society (p. 218), synopticism 
watches over the officials themselves. Synopticismis 
used to ―represent the situation where a large number 
focuses on something in common which is 
condensed.‖ It can act as the opposite of panopticism, 
and thus here the many watch the few. So each 
society becomes ―a viewer society‖ (p. 219), in which 
panopticism and synopticism mostly merge into one 
observing standpoint. Mathieson takes Big Brother‘s 
telescreens as the ultimate form representing the 
fusion of panopticism and synopticism, as both Big 
Brother and people watch each other at the same time. 
Accordingly, the ―intersecting gazes of panopticism,‖ 
in Mathieson‘s terminology (p. 229), incorporate the 
simultaneous observing activities of both the involved 
parties. As such, Smurov‘s ―Gestalts‖ in others‘ 
minds is significant (Grishakova, 2012, p. 170). 
 
The problem with the narrator‘s panoptical watch 
over Smurov – as the narrator he invisibly watches 
over the physical Smurov– is that the ghost-narrator 
cannot discipline the physical Smurov until they 
merge into one. He tells Vanya that ―actually I wear a 
On the Panoptical Eye of Self-Caring inNabokov‘s The Eye 
 
37 
mask—I am always hidden behind a mask‖ (The 
Eye,1990, Kindle). The hidden personality behind the 
mask acts as the monoptical, as a derivation of the 
panoptical, an observer who surveys ―Smurovian-
masks‖ (The Eye, 1990, Kindle). Here is a manifest-
tation of what Mathieson (1997) says regarding the 
fusion of the Panopticon and the synopticon, with the 
Panopticon bearing the concept of the monopticon 
too. Panopticism and synopticism have ―developed an 
intimate interaction, even fusion, with each other.‖ 
The same systems of surveillance have often been 
panoptical and synoptical simultaneously, as in the 
―Roman Catholic Church‖, ―the Inquisition‖, and ―the 
military‖, where there are both hidden individual 
puppeteers behind the scenes and apparent acting 
agents on the front (p. 223). The ―Smurovian masks‖ 
are in fact the versions of Smurov that appear in the 
presence of others‘ observing eyes. And as they 
reflect back to Smurov‘s feedbacks about his identity, 
these reflections represent his Gestalts. Thus, the 
narrator says, 
I could already count three versions of Smurov, 
while the original remained unknown. This 
occurs in scientific classification. Long ago, 
Linnaeus described a common species of 
butterfly, adding the laconic note “in pratis 
Westmanniae.”. . . . . . . Where is the type, the 
model, the original? (The Eye, 1990). 
 
Here Johnson (1973) holds that since the narrator 
decides to establish ―the real Smurov‖ as the sum of 
the reflections he evokes in others, he becomes an 
entomologist who studies the diversities of a 
specimen of insects to guess the original creature from 
which they descended. Each descendent might differ 
from its original form due to their present biological 
conditions, but they also have similarities with the 
original form and constitute the different parts of its 
intricatepuzzle. Accordingly, the narrator finds out 
that Smurov‘s images held by others or ―collectors‖ 
vary in accordance with the ―particular‖ contacts each 
of them has with him (pp. 2-3), as well as with ―the 
climatic conditions prevailing in various souls‖ (The 
Eye, 1990, Kindle). It is then obligatory to know the 
others― in all of their secondary associations to assess 
their versions of Smurov […] in order to establish 
[Smurov‘s] holotype‖ for his truest image (Johnson, 
1997, p. 3). The narrator thus begins to pay attention 
to Smurov‘s versions in others‘ eyes. Vanya considers 
Smurov as ―a good, intelligent person‖ with ―poetic 
imagination‖, with a ―propensity to exaggerate at 
times‖, as a man who is kind towards everyone, and 
as a guy who is ―always absurd and charming.‖ To 
Mukhin, Smurov is ―such a scoundrel‖. Vanya‘s 
uncle‘s has ―the happiest, the shortest-lived image of 
Smurov‖; he thinks Smurov is their future bride-
groom. Smurov is a criminal to be punished right 
away before his two pupils. Bogdanovich‘s account 
of Smurov, in his letter to Robrtovich, labels him a 
member of ―sexual lefties‖ who frequently break the 
law and ―a thief in the ugliest sense of the word,‖ a 
kleptomaniac. Gretchen (or Hilda) takes Smurov as a 
silly boyfriend whom she dupes into wearing a stolen 
tie. Weinstock‘s description of Smurov is ―an 
adventurer,‖ ―a Don Juan, a Casanova,‖ ―a double or 
triple agent,‖ ―a very odd character,‖ ―a man knit of 
incomplete intimations, a man with a secret hidden in 
him‖. Evgenia considers him as a shy, sensitive, and 
young man, lacking experience with people. 
Marianna‘s Smurov is a ―brutal and brilliant officer of 
the White Army, the kind that went around stringing 
people up right and left‖. And finally, Kashmarin 
develops ―yet another image‖ of Smurov. Each 
character preserves an exclusive idea of Smurov. 
These reflections, emitted from ―the many-faceted 
Russian intelligentsia‖, are parts of the ―classification 
of Smurovian masks‖ – which are still subject to 
change in future due to the ―branching structure‖ and 
the ―wavering nature of life‖ (The Eye, 1990, Kindle). 
Hence, Joann Karges‘ remarks on the theme of 
systematics in The Eye. The narrator-Smurov hunts 
for the ―specification‖ of and ―identification‖ with the 
real Smurov from which only its ―paratypes‖ exist 
(1985, pp. 65-66). This butterfly metaphor suggests 
that an original source which once existed is now lost 
(Rutledge, 2011, p. 97). According to Smurov 
himself, 
I do not exist: there exist but the thousands of 
mirrors that reflect me. With every acquaintance 
I make, the population of phantoms resembling 
me increases. Somewhere they live, somewhere 
they multiply. I alone do not exist. Smurov, 
however, will live on for a long time. […] and so 
my name and my ghost will appear fleetingly 
here and there for some time still. Then will 
come the end. (The Eye,1990) 
 
Therefore, there are myriad versions of Smurov 
which are radiated from others‘ eyes as they blink him 
into existence. However, as others close their eyes, 
their versions of Smurov are still replaced by other 
ones. In Rylkova‘s view (2002), Nabokov‘s story 
recounts ―Smurov‘s learning to cope with his 
scattered personality‖ (p. 48). Nabokov‘s story at the 
same time highlights the fact that identity is like a 
―chameleon‖ in continual adjustments to environ-
mental changes (Mohanu, 2001, p. 81).The synoptical 
network of power relations between Smurov and 
others emphasizes the inevitability of such state of 
living. This does not mean that he is bound to be 
defined by others for his existence; numerous labels 
expose him to a realm of definitions the transiency of 
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which resists absolute definition. Such resistance is 
the inevitable outcome of relations any man may have 
with others. In fact, pursuing himself in the third 
person and through his reflections in others, the ―I‖ of 
the story hesitates ―between megalomania and an 
inferiority complex‖ (Grishakova, 2012, p. 172). And 
thus he finds himself into a new state of living. 
 
The Care of the Self and Parrhesia 
 
In its self-discovering activities, the self can take two 
forms: one form is a subject who actively seeks 
something, while the other form is an object that is 
itself passively sought. This process is the same as the 
―care of the self‖ which results in a subjectivity as 
―the concrete form of activity that defines the 
relationship of the self to itself‖ (McGushin, 2011, p. 
129). That is because ―subjectivity, as a dynamic, 
active relationship‖ can take on several different 
shapes (Foucault, 1996, p. 440). Looking at the self, 
one may ontologically wonder whether his/her 
existence is a total ―material substance‖ or ―an 
immaterial‖ one, and whether it is in a symbiotic 
relation to the body for worldly perception and action 
(McGushin, 2011, p. 130). Even if one‘s true self ever 
exists, it is still bound to the body until the body lives. 
The idea of ―a true self within‖ behind the mask of 
reality conveys a specific relationship of the self to 
itself. Foucault calls this new subjectivity ―herme-
neutic‖ or ―confessional‖, standing respectively for 
the ―activities of self-interpretation and self-express-
ion‖ (p. 134). In other words, the individual is then to 
interpret his own self, to explain it to himself, in order 
to most truly recognize his self and escape identity 
crisis. These activities do not bespeak an inner truth; 
rather, they are activities toward becoming a different 
person with new relations towards the self, a taking 
―care of the self‖, an ―aesthetics of the self‖. In 
Foucault‘s view (2001), 
For one does not have to take up a position or 
role towards oneself as that of a judge pronounc-
ing a verdict. One can comport oneself towards 
oneself in the role of a technician, of a crafts-
man, of an artist, who from time to time stops 
working, examines what he is doing, reminds 
himself of the rules of his art, and compares 
these rules with what he has achieved thus far. 
(p. 166) 
 
Afterwards a new discipline is born. In Foucault view, 
discipline is not surveillance but ―the regulation of 
behavior or attitude‖ after surveillance (Mathieson, 
1997, p. 228). By realizing the monoptical and synop-
tical relations of power, by having new surveying 
outlooks towards human relations, the narrator-
Smurov finally controls himself. It is manifested in 
the final merging of the narrator and Smurov and his 
final statement that he decides not to care for 
whatever reflection his existence may create in others, 
since identity will not remain fixed. As Foucault says, 
in the modern era, the human body enters ―a 
machinery power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it‖ ad infinitum (1979, p. 138). Acting and 
behaving differently in different conditions require 
constant self-sacrificing in order to deal with the 
dynamic state of human affairs. This is what Smurov 
undertakes by shooting his former being. This act of 
freedom is a technique of the ―care of the self‖ and the 
transformation necessary for subjectivity. Foucault 
considers freedom as ―a matter of experimentation‖; 
entering ―a space of concrete freedom‖ is not to 
recognize who we are as established personalities but 
to try the different ―possible transformations‖ that life 
can offer us (1990, p. 36). Freedom is therefore ―a 
praxis‖, a way of dealing with ourselves, others, and 
the world (Mendieta, 2011, p. 112).  
 
In more details, freedom as such is achieved through 
parrhesia and the ―care of the self.‖ Freedom is a 
―creative‖ process, which results not from ultimate 
submission to external powers but from generating 
power over oneself, a power which one is able to 
exercise over others as well (p. 116). In this sense, 
freedom is not achieved in isolation but only results 
from the power relations we have with others, 
something that initially requires us to be true to 
ourselves. As such, the individual stands in a 
parrhesiastic relationship with himself; that is, in 
a position to be truthful to himself. Although 
parrhesia typically stands for fearless speech and the 
parrhesiast is someone who critically and frankly 
speaks the truth before the truth-mongers (Foucault, 
2001, p. 11), a parrhesiastic attitude is not exclusive 
to someone of this type. Being true to oneself and 
having a critical attitude against the absolute condition 
of something is parrhesiastic enough. ―Being 
courageous enough to disclose the truth about 
oneself‖ away from self-delusion is parrhesiastic (p. 
143).As Stone points out, the final stage in the use of 
parrhesia is in ―one‘s private life‖ and ―one‘s 
personal relationships.‖ Smurov tries to watch over 
himself, which is a parrhesiastic act of self-caring. 
We hear Nabokov‘s narrator saying, ―Ever since the 
shot—that shot which, in my opinion, had been 
fatal—I had observed myself with curiosity instead of 
sympathy, and my painful past—before the shot—
was now foreign to me ― (The Eye,1990). Initially 
punishing himself through suicide because of his past 
life, Smurov now decides to take care of himself. He 
decides to be on guard, both monoptically and 
synoptically, over his actions. The panoptic tower of 
surveillance is thus watching him, inside and outside. 
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So, he experiences a transition from ―the torture of the 
body to the transformation of the soul‖ (Mathieson, 
1997, p. 216). His body is no more to suffer while his 
soul is the object of constant metamorphoses. 
Reading Nabokov‘s novella, we are, as Foucault says, 
―in the panoptical machine, invested by its effects of 
power, which we bring to ourselves since we are a 
part of its mechanism‖ (1979, p. 217).Therefore, due 
to the socio-historical nature of subjectivity, Foucault 
emphasizes that it is always possible to experience a 
being or beings other than what we presently are, the 




Whether in agony before his ultimate physical death 
in the case of his self-shooting, or even in his pains 
when he imagines life in a purgatorial condition after 
his suicidal attempt, Nabokov‘s protagonist in The 
Eye is reborn into a new state of living in which he 
experiences himself anew. Initially bound by 
temporality, Smurov is liberated from his primary self 
through his subconscious mind. He is reborn into 
beings which are often unstuck in time. As a Russian 
émigré, Smurov is under historically given constraints 
which are intensified by his initial sense of absurdity. 
His self-discovery, which begins with an act of 
suicide, leads to the recognition of the fact that his 
identity is made of an amalgam of images radiating 
from himself, just to be reflected from and deciphered 
by others. This fact brings him a state of happiness at 
the end of the novella and after all his torturing 
wonderings. By experiencing himself through a third-
person perspective, Smurov disciplines himself 
through self-caring and panopticism, so as to watch 
over himself for self-recognition. His parrhesiastic 
relation to himself, his doppelganger‘s monoptic eye, 
and others‘ synoptic eyes of surveillance begin and 
continue to watch him and mirror back to him the 
portrait he has shown them. And each portrait, as 
reflected back to Smurov, adds to his developing self. 
As such, Smurov develops a dynamic relationship 
with himself which establishes his new and self-
conscious state of being. At the end of the novella, 
when the narrator and Smurov become one, he 
stoically announces his self-discovery by acknow-
ledging the importance of the never-blinking eye of 
surveillance in the shaping of his identity and his 
tolerance over any sarcasm. 
 
Having punished himself as a result of feeling shame 
before others, Smurov now disciplines himself, as in a 
Panopticon, and tries to be on guard both monopti-
cally and synoptically over his deeds thereafter. The 
changes which he experiences reflect both his critical 
attitude towards his prior state of living, because of 
which he punishes himself, and a tendency to self-
caring attitudes towards life and his identity. He 
observes that true happiness is relative, and that he 
shall, for a more sophisticated state of living, 
fundamentally keep in balance the relations of power 
between himself and others. Inherent in both 
monopticism and synopticism is a centrality of power 
which helps the observer with accounts of his 
situation. As versions of panopticism, these two are in 
fact the inevitable participants in the formation of 
one‘s identity towards self-discovery. Smurov‘s 
attempt at self-discovery is a manifestation of his 
attempt to be truthful to himself, thus fulfilling the 
concept of the parrhesia. And all these together 
highlight the power relations embedded in the 
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